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WHO DEFENDS CAPITAL DEFENDANTS?
Robert Weisberg*
Who defends capital defendants? This is a brief look at
the demographics of that question. The main issue, of course,
is the pool of trial lawyers, but, as I will suggest, one must
also look at the demographics of the appellate and habeas
lawyers as well. These lawyers are, after all, the last and
sometimes, best hope for the lives of the defendants, and
their appellate claims often focus on the quality of represen-
tation by the trial lawyers.
On first inquiry, capital trial lawyers come from the
same pool of defenders as in criminal cases generally: state-
paid public defenders, private lawyers working on govern-
ment appointments, and privately-retained lawyers. Even in
the large variety of non- capital cases, the last of these cate-
gories is probably the smallest, and the allocation between
the first and second varies tremendously by state and even
county. In capital cases, the third category is even smaller. I
myself have often fantasized that some day I would be asked
to represent-at least on appeal-an extremely rich and ex-
tremely innocent capital defendant who hired me on retainer.
I have also imagined winning the New York City Marathon.
The State virtually always pays for the defense of those
whom it seeks to execute. We are so used to Gideon v. Wain-
wright's' noble and largely uncontroversial ideals that we
sometimes forget what a strange system we have. The State
subdivides itself into prosecutor and judge, and then subdi-
vides itself further to give the prosecutor an antagonist, paid
for by the State, and paid to oppose the State. We somehow
assume that this system can finesse conflicts of interest.
That is not always true. Certainly there are some indigent
defendants who suspect that their public defenders, who are
not only government employees but also repeat players in
* Professor of Law, Stanford University; J.D., 1979, Stanford University;
Ph.D. in English, 1971, Harvard University; BA., 1966, City College of New
York.
1. 372 U.S. 335 (1963) (setting forth the right to counsel in criminal cases).
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regular competition with prosecutors, may have more inter-
est in sustaining good relations with their employers than in
ardently attacking the government's case. I think such a con-
cern would be utterly false, but remember that the disap-
pointed clients here are, by definition, facing execution.
On the other hand, whenever a political official tries to
attack expenditures for public defenders, she is likely to point
to the absurdity of paying lawyers who are constantly attack-
ing their employers. Sometimes these officials attempt a fine
distinction: state-paid lawyers may try to prove that a partic-
ular defendant is innocent, but they may not become class-
action type impact litigators who try to subvert the very basis
of state legislation. Most defense lawyers will point out that
such a distinction does not work-especially in death cases.
Let us look at the odd nature of this system from several
other perspectives. When I teach Criminal Procedure, and
the unit on ineffective assistance of counsel, I throw in the
phrase "state action." That phrase, of course, is derived from
general constitutional law and does not often turn up in crim-
inal procedure. The underlying question is whether there is
state action if a state-paid defense lawyer renders ineffective
assistance. More oddly, is there state action when it is a pri-
vate lawyer?2 How can that be? I will leave that conundrum
there, because it is just part of the odd nature of the whole
system. 3 Critical Legal scholars love to probe the subtleties
of the so-called public-private distinction in the law, and the
way legal doctrine endlessly redraws that boundary.4 This is
a good example. But in any event, the State violates the
Sixth Amendment when it denies the defendant a lawyer al-
together, or when it directly places unfair constraints on the
lawyer.5 Yet, it also violates the Constitution if it, in effect,
negligently hires a lawyer who does a terrible job, or even if it
permits or acquiesces indirectly in the poor job done by a pri-
vate lawyer.6 Of course, in recent years, the Supreme Court
has helped mitigate what might appear to be the absurdity of
2. See Cuyler v. Sullivan, 446 U.S. 335 (1980).
3. But see Jon R. Waltz, Inadequacy of Trial Defense Representation as a
Ground for Post-Conviction Relief in Criminal Cases, 59 Nw. U. L. REv. 289
(1964).
4. See, e.g., MARK KELMAN, A GUIDE TO CRricAL LEGAL STUDIES, 102-09
(1987).
5. See, e.g., Gideon, 372 U.S. at 344.
6. See, e.g., Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984).
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this system, by lowering the standard of minimal competence
to a level where the State is not requiring much of an adver-
sary for itself-I will return to this subject later.7
What has been the recent history of capital representa-
tion? Let us look at two very different places: the South, and
California. In the early years of post-Furman8 death litiga-
tion, a not entirely unfair stereotype of a Southern scenario
went thus: The defense lawyer was a local general litigator
who took on a court appointment. He was paid very little,
though he may not have complained much, because he did
not plan to put much time into the case anyway. Even if he
had wanted to rack up the hours, there was little he could do
because he had little understanding of what to do in a sen-
tence hearing, as opposed to a guilt hearing. Some defenders
reported not having read the new statutes, 9 so they were una-
ware that there was this new-fangled legal phenomenon
called a penalty phase, with witnesses and argument, etc.
Others vaguely knew of this new legal procedure, but finding,
interviewing, and preparing numerous possible character
witnesses, and constructing a psycho-biography of their client
were not part of their general activity.
The fees were infamously low. The second capital appeal
I worked on was a case where the defense lawyer was paid
$150 for the entire case, and believe me, he earned every
penny of it. He only interviewed his client once, as he was
arranging a plea bargain for the guilt phase. He did not iden-
tify or reach out to any of the several, excellent mitigation
witnesses-teachers, coaches, ministers, or whatever-who
were only a few hours' drive away. The reason for the omis-
sion, he said, was that he thought the case hopeless. He
never attacked the confession in the case, even though, as it
later became obvious, the defendant was left alone in the in-
terrogation room with an off-duty police officer who was a
cousin of the victim, and who threatened the defendant with
7. Id.
8. Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972) (holding that death penalty as
then administered constituted cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the
Eighth Amendment).
9. Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976) (holding that new statutes which
require balancing of aggravating and mitigating factors satisfy Eighth
Amendment).
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a gun. He did not try to interview the officer, because he did
not like the man. 10
Moreover, however pitiful the lawyer's fees, even more
pitiful were the investigative fees-a crucial point for sen-
tencing hearings. So even those lawyers who understood the
theory of a penalty phase were helpless to do the necessary
preparation. What happened in those cases? Though almost
200 Southern inmates have been executed in the last decade
or so, the vast majority of inmates have survived-if only in a
lingering state on death row. Some have won on appeal-
occasionally reversals of their convictions, but far more often
reversals of their death sentences. Others have never exactly
won in any court, but they have not wholly lost either: Their
claims have been tied up in the complex procedures of the
state and federal habeas courts, and so they somehow stay
alive, with their cases perpetually unresolved.
Who has lawyered these appeals, and where? A few were
won by local lawyers in the state appellate courts. The most
dramatic victories, however, were in the federal courts on
habeas; and the appellate lawyers were the best in the coun-
try-dedicated, brilliantly trained lawyers from nonprofit or-
ganizations in the South, but most from the NAACP Legal
Defense and Educational Fund, Inc. ("Inc. Fund")," including
such great lawyers as Anthony Amsterdam, Jack Boger, and
James Liebman. Why were they able to win? First, because
they were superb lawyers. Second, because by historical acci-
dent there were so many kinks to be worked out in the South-
ern death penalty statutes that they often had large, dra-
matic constitutional issues to litigate, especially in federal
court. Third, sometimes they won because they were able to
prove ineffective assistance among local trial lawyers, at a
time when many Southern federal judges were open to the
notion of capital appeals as essentially broad civil rights ac-
tions. That notion is what motivated the Inc. Fund to pursue
those cases, and its lawyers to work endless, grueling hours
at minimal salaries.
What has happened in the South now? There has proba-
bly been a marginal improvement in the quality of trial litiga-
tion. Some of the trials are done by well-trained public de-
fenders or appointed lawyers, and fees have probably gone up
10. Mitchell v. Kemp, 762 F.2d 886 (11th 1985).
11. Hereinafter the "Inc. Fund."
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modestly. Other civil rights or death penalty organizations
have emerged in the South to do the local work that the Inc.
Fund could not possibly absorb. 12 There are some Southern
trial lawyers who share some of the dedication and idealism
of the Inc. Fund appellate lawyers, though, as I will suggest,
by this time such idealism seems even more futile. The out-
comes, however, may still turn on the vagaries of the jury's
attitude and potential empathy for the defendant. And then,
if they lose, there is little chance to win on appeal, because
most of those great constitutional issues, or even mid-level
appellate issues concerning the application or constitutional-
ity of various aggravating circumstances or statutory proce-
dures, have disappeared.1 3 In other words, the kinks have
been worked out to the satisfaction of the federal courts.
Thus, the Inc. Fund no longer has many great cases to bring.
In any event, as cases have proliferated and become less sus-
ceptible to aggregation under broad themes, there are too
many cases for a central organization to handle. The cause
has become splintered and diffuse.
When a case does come up on appeal, the problem is
more likely to be with highly peculiar, fact-specific problems
of evidence-gathering, admission or preclusion, or quality of
argument. All too often, an appellate court will turn down an
issue because the lawyer waived it and it was harmless error
anyway.1 4 What is left on appeal? Both the waiver and
harmless error issues are very difficult to finesse, but a
habeas lawyer will try to get over these difficult hurdles. As
the difficulty increases, the temptation is to go in the other
direction: to concede that the lawyer was incompetent and to
make that the basis of the appeal. The waiver issue magi-
cally disappears, but the appellate lawyer is left arguing the
lawyer's incompetence under the minimal standards of
12. A notable example is the Southern Poverty Law Center.
13. Perhaps the last great defense bar victory was Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S.
586 (1978) (Eighth Amendment requires that capital defendant be able to prof-
fer any mitigating facts bearing on his character or record or offense, regardless
of statutory restrictions).
14. See John W. Poulos, Capital Punishment, the Legal Process, and the
Emergence of the Lucas Court in California, 23 U.C. DAVIS L. REv. 157, 306-13
(1990).
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Strickland-and facing the harmless error problem
anyway. 15
Thus, appellate lawyers, who like to argue broad dra-
matic constitutional themes, end up re-trying facts, arguing
that little mistakes in particular factual contexts might have
shifted the perception of the overall factual context. More-
over, the appellate lawyer then has to put the trial lawyer on
trial. To do so, she must not only attack what he did, but also
conceive what he should have done, which is to say that we
get a kind of shadow, imaginary trial envisioned by the de-
fense appellate lawyer-the witnesses the trial lawyer
should have found, the testimony they would have given, the
summary arguments the lawyer would have made.
The picture looks just a little different in California. Let
us go back to the 1970's, when new death penalty laws were
passed. The trial lawyers appear much better than they did
in the South. They were better. Though it is risky to draw
stereotypes, if the Southern trial lawyer was a local yokel
member of the congenial private bar, in California, the trial
lawyer was an ardently liberal, very-smart Boalt graduate
working in the Alameda county public defender's office. They
did not win all their cases-maybe about half of the capital
defendants got death sentences-but they did fairly well, and
if they lost, they had the assurance of an excellent appellate
defense bar which would make the appellate claims look
broad and dramatic.
Who were the appellate lawyers? They were not from the
Inc. Fund, which concentrated its efforts in the South, and
which, frankly, was not needed much in California. Most im-
portantly, they were staff attorneys at the State Public De-
fender's Office 16, and they were terrific and won many victo-
ries. All too famously, or infamously, they won sixty-four
reversals out of the sixty-eight cases heard during the years
that Chief Justice Rose Bird sat on the California Supreme
Court. 1 7 In fact, there is no easy 1970's California analogy to
15. See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984) (the "prejudice"
test).
16. For an early history, see George Yuhas, Note, Statewide Public De.
fender Organizations: An Appealing Alternative, 29 STAN. L. REV. 157 (1976).
17. For the subsequent history of capital appeals in California, see Poulos,
supra note 14; John Poulos, The Lucas Court and Capital Punishment: The
Original Understanding of the Special Circumstances, 30 SANTA CLARA L. REv.
333 (1990).
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all those federal habeas corpus cases in the South, because
the cases never got to the federal courts. By the way, many of
the appellate lawyers were individual appointees from the
private bar, from academia, or even large law firms. The lat-
ter quickly learned that taking on an appointment for a stat-
utory fee was tantamount to taking on a case pro bono. A
major San Francisco or Los Angeles law firm loses a lot of
money when its lawyers bill at $60 or $75 an hour.
Let me note one irony concerning the public-private dis-
tinction in California. When George Deukmejian became
Governor in 1983, he set out to slash the budget of the Office
of the State Public Defender. He thought that death appeals
were the duty of the private bar, and he induced the creation
of the California Appellate Project ("CAP"), an arm of the
nominally private State Bar of California.1 8 CAP was to do
many of the appeals itself and supervise private appointed
lawyers in others. So, who ended up working for CAP? It
was Michael Millman, the lead death penalty lawyer from the
State Public Defender's Office, and some of his best staffers,
who crossed the street, got better offices and slightly better
pay in their now nominally private jobs. A perfect compro-
mise: Deukmejian won his symbolic victory and CAP still had
plenty of state money. For a while, CAP continued to win big
appellate victories.
After a while, however, any dramatic victories on major
issues under federal constitutional law were reversed by the
United States Supreme Court. 19 Further, more local victories
under the state constitution or state statutes were reversed
by the post-Bird Court, which quickly decreased the reversal
rate, comparing two five-year periods, from 95 percent to
about 20 percent.20 This is where California is now. There
are too many cases for CAP to handle.21 There are still bril-
18. For a brief review of the history of the California Appellate Project
(CAP), see Philip Carrizosa, High Court Will Pick Death Row Counsel, S.F.
DAILY J., Mar. 25, 1992, at 1.
19. E.g., California v. Ramos, 463 U.S. 992 (1983) (reversing Bird Court de-
cision which had held that statutory instruction informing jury that life sen-
tence without parole could be commuted, but not mentioning possible commuta-
tion of death sentence was unconstitutional).
20. See Philip Carrizosa, Death Case Law Weathers a Sea Change, S.F.
DAILY J., Apr. 6, 1992, at 1.
21. The State Supreme Court, apparently thinking CAP was too slow and
selective in picking appellate attorneys, has now relieved CAP of the function of
arranging appellate counsel. See Carrizosa, supra note 20.
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liant trial lawyers, but they have fewer issues to work with
and they are stretched thinner. The rates of capital charging
went down for a time when prosecutors were discouraged by
Bird court opinions, but now, at least for prosecutors, things
are on the upswing. The trial lawyers still win their share of
life verdicts at trial, but that is where the good news for them
ends. No one wins on direct appeal in the California Supreme
Court anymore. There are no big issues, and where you can
manage to fashion an appellate issue, the court will find it
harmless error. What, then, is the point of appealing? It has
become largely an empty exercise to exhaust your remedies in
order to get to habeas.
And what does that mean? To some extent, it means us-
ing the federal district courts as mini-Supreme Courts to re-
view questions of constitutional law, and, in effect, to reverse
the legal decisions of the state supreme court. But recall,
there are precious few of those issues. What remains is
habeas, and let us put that in perspective.
The other, and currently more important, purpose of
habeas corpus is to generate new issues that were not appeal-
able earlier because they are based on so-called extra-record
evidence not generated at trial. These issues are not limited
to claims of ineffectiveness, but ineffectiveness represents the
largest share. You go through this very odd procedure called
state habeas, not because there is great hope that you can
win there-though you see the occasional victory-but be-
cause the odd nature of that proceeding permits you to per-
form the extra-record evidentiary review that you cannot do
on direct appeal. Perhaps you win there, but at least you de-
velop a far better record to argue when you lose and proceed
to federal court. If the federal court orders an evidentiary
hearing, you may get a chance to do further investigation,
but, regardless, you will have a better basis in the state
habeas evidence. There is only one major problem with this:
it is very expensive, and though the California Supreme
Court has arguably made some reasonable effort to maintain
a living wage in terms of attorneys' fees, it has been brutal in
slashing the fees available for investigation-usually al-
lowing no more than $3,000 in a case.2"
22. Payment Guidelines for Appointed Counsel Representing Indigent
Criminal Appellants in the California Supreme Court, CAL. R. OF CT., Compen-
sation Standard 2-2-1 (West, State Ed., revised 1993).
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Defense lawyers understandably denounce this as outra-
geous and unfair; nevertheless, let us take a somewhat differ-
ent perspective. This is indeed an insane system. Our main
method of protecting the rights of a condemned inmate is to
conduct an extremely expensive para-trial, the trial that
should have taken place, arguing the claims that should have
been argued, hypothesizing the evidence that should have
brought forth, and then trying to convince a judge that this
scenario was plausible and would have led to a different out-
come. Perhaps, from this perspective, we can understand
why politicians find it easible to attack this sort of thing as
obstructing the will of the people.
What sorts of issues get raised on habeas? Examples are:
the state suppressed or failed to disclose exculpatory evi-
dence; the defense has just discovered new evidence; the state
used false evidence; the jurors misconducted themselves in
the jury room-they took drugs, fell asleep, read forbidden
papers, etc.; the informers were paid to lie, etc.23
What, then, are the new pressures on defense lawyers?
Their professional lives tend to be more full of exhausting ex-
istential battles than spirited civil rights campaigns. Of
course, many feel that the death penalty is racist and cruel,
but they find little or no encouragement in any political de-
bate on the subject-the civil rights spirit seems very old his-
tory. Many remain deeply motivated anyway-their hatred
for capital charges is almost visceral-, and tend to view any
individual case as Armageddon, even if not part of a progres-
sive political movement. They are paid very little: try finding
some profit after you have paid the overhead out of $75 or
$100 per hour, plus a few thousand for expenses. As a public
defender, you make a half-decent civil service wage, but that
seems small when you divide by the number of hours, and
even smaller when you compare this figure to the private firm
salaries that many of the these fine lawyers could easily com-
mand. They get lots of psychic income, though. I call them
the ADMs-the aggressively downwardly mobile.
Even in California, but more particularly in the South,
some are still incompetent, maliciously so, or just over-
whelmed. Thus, the appellate lawyers have put more and
more effort into a desperate bid for later habeas relief-by
23. I have seen proposals for habeas investigations to check the country
club affiliations of the prosecutors to prove their racial bias.
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generating lots of issues for evidentiary hearings in habeas.
At the same time, the trial lawyers get the message that they
have to be absurdly thorough in lawyering the original case.
They cannot afford to lose an issue because of waiver, so they
paper the trial judge to death with motions, and go to ex-
treme lengths to tilt the evidence in their direction, even in
hopeless cases, because they know they will face the harmless
error problem even if they have a good appellate claim. More-
over, they must implicitly cooperate in the understanding
that they may be attacked as incompetent.
The liberals probably sense the absurdity of this scheme,
but defend it as, often, the defense's only hope. The conserva-
tives tend not to be so fastidious. They see the defense bar as
using litigation to subvert the fabled will of the people, turn-
ing the real trial into a mere first round or side show, and
then contriving endless habeas maneuvers to delay disaster,
if not achieve victory.24 Of course, the structure of federal
habeas corpus is determined by Congress, and in each of the
recent efforts to create a federal crime bill, there have been
proposals to change habeas. The gist of these proposals goes
back to Justice Powell's report from some years back where
he proposed what appeared to many a sensible new scheme,
in which federal habeas would be regulated as an efficient,
quick, but serious form of appeal.25 Defense lawyers would
face strict time lines, and, except in the most extraordinary
circumstances, would be allowed only one chance in the fed-
eral courts. Recognizing that part of the cause of lengthy and
repetitive appeals was the incompetence of trial lawyers, Jus-
tice Powell, the great balancer, sensibly suggested a trade-off:
states would have to "qualify" for these new habeas rules by
ensuring better-and better paid-trial lawyers in capital
cases.
26
The Powell report never became law. To some extent, it
failed simply because it was stuck in the mish-mash of other
elements of federal crime bills-capital murder laws protect-
ing federal poultry inspectors, etc. To some extent, it failed
24. Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72, 89 (1977) (noting danger of "sandbag-
ging" by defense lawyer).
25. See Ad Hoc Committee on Federal Habeas Corpus in Capital Cases, Re-
port on Habeas Corpus in Capital Cases, 45 CRIM. L. REP. (BNA) 3239 (1989);
see also Robert Weisberg, A Great Writ While It Lasted, 81 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMI-
NOLOGY 9 (1990).
26. See Ad Hoc Committee, supra note 25.
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because of its own controversial extra baggage: the federal
bills added very Draconian restrictions on the sorts of sub-
stantive issues one could raise on habeas. In 1994, for better
or for worse, President Clinton did get his "smorgasbord"
crime bill through Congress, 27 but habeas "reform" is not part
of of the bill. Even a Congress that could finesse the argu-
ments over the assault weapons ban28 could not reach any
consensus on habeas. Thus, we are back to the situation
where Supreme Court interpretations of the federal statute
have been brutal in rejecting claims based on waiver, exhaus-
tion, and harmless error grounds, along with the new Teague
rules.29 Yet somehow, some way, many lawyers manage to
get some sort of stay or evidentiary hearing in some court
long enough to get their clients into the typical death row
state of suspended animation. Ironically, the new risk of in-
competent representation is at the federal habeas stage. The
practitioner manuals on litigating habeas claims are not
rocket science. They are much harder than rocket science.
The requirements for weaving your claim through and
around the obstacles to federal review are medieval and theo-
logical in subtlety. °
To conclude, trial lawyers in death penalty cases have
miserable jobs which they somehow find exhilarating. When
done competently, the cases are not campaigns; they are or-
deals. The lawyers must assume no hope for victory on ap-
peal, so the sole focus is an acquittal or a life verdict. The
lawyer's personal life is likely to become wholly intertwined
with her client's, in part because she has to present a sympa-
thetic mitigating portrait to have any hope of saving his life,
in part because that just tends to happen in such intense
cases. On the other hand, equally desperate efforts will be
27. See Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994, Pub. L.
No. 103-322, Sept. 13, 1994.
28. Id. at tit. XIA.
29. See Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288 (1989) (no right of federal habeas
corpus relief where claim is for "new rule" of federal constitutional law); see also
Weisberg, supra note 25.
30. The best way to get a sense of this subtlety and complexity is to read the
works of our leading scholar of federal habeas corpus, Professor James Lieb-
man. See, e.g., James S. Liebman, Apocalypse Next Time?: The Anachronistic
Attack on Habeas Corpus/Direct Review Parity, 92 COLUM. L. REV. 1997 (1992);
James S. Liebman, More than 'Slightly Retro": The Rehnquist Court's Rout of
Habeas Corpus Jurisdiction in Teague v. Lane, 18 N.Y.U. REv. L. & Soc.
CHANGE 537 (1990-91).
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made on appeal to do all the things the trial lawyer did not
do, and sometimes to prove how awful he was for not doing
them. Meanwhile, this is all very expensive. In today's dem-
agogic climate, you rarely hear any practical cost-benefit
analysis about criminal justice. Ironically, you occasionally
hear it coming from the halls of county or local government,
where officials recognize that to bring a capital charge will
break the county budget.31
Who will defend capital defendants in the future? I do
not foresee any dramatic changes for a long time. The state
of the art in capital defense and the demographics of the de-
fense bar are ultimately, if indirectly, related to the political
structure of capital punishment in the United States, which
now is a very stable structure. All politicians favor capital
punishment; many call for more of it, although many do so
cynically, because they know it is largely a symbolic issue;
and the people are satisfied if an occasional execution re-
minds them that the art form is still alive. Since the death
penalty is here to stay, dramatic change would only occur if
political rhetoric translated into reality, and we had, for in-
stance, the prospect of a thousand executions a year. More
lawyers might be pressed into service. As the pressure in-
creased, so might the morale, ironically enough, because it
might become a progressive cause again. But none of this is
likely. The existential ordeal of the lonely capital defense
lawyer will continue for a long time.
31. See, e.g., A California County's Bankruptcy Delays a Murder Trial, N.Y.
TIMES, Jan. 22, 1995, at 14 (explaining how the bankruptcy of Orange County
obstructs the start of the capital murder trial of Charles Ng, whose serial mur-
der case was transferred because of venue change).
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